To determine the value of a pension, individuals need to consider their survival risk. In this paper, I first elicit survival probabilities for a broad set of target ages, using a representative panel of the 18-70 year-old Swiss population. I document a systematic survival belief bias, which is the stylized fact that individuals underestimate their survival probabilities (compared to actuarial life tables). Then, I show that incorrect information about longevity in general is a substantial component of this bias. Next, I implement an incentivized experiment that requires subjects to make risky pension choices, in which payoffs are not affected by participants’ own longevity. I find that longevity pessimism induces earlier and less risky choices about the timing of pension benefits, under annuity or lump-sum pension schemes. Finally, I show that happiness and satisfaction have an indirect effect on pension choices through the channel of longevity pessimism.

We adapt the design of five experimental studies on retirement decision-making and conduct reproductions with a larger sample from the broader population. We reproduce most of the main effects of the original studies. In particular, we find that consumption decisions are less efficient when subjects need to borrow from the future than save from the present. When subjects collect retirement benefits as lump-sum instead of annuities, they choose to retire later. The duration of retirement affects the saving behavior of the subjects. Savings are higher when they are incentivized with matching contributions than with tax rebates. When faced with stochastic survival risk, subjects make partial adjustments to spending paths. We also propose a further experimental research agenda in related topics and discuss practical issues on subject recruitment, attrition, and redesign of complex tasks.

Many national governments have a stated policy goal of increasing voluntary retirement savings. Tax-incentivized schemes, that require investors to forego liquidity of its balance in exchange for higher total returns, are its main implementation tool. Precautionary savings, however, might deter participation in these voluntary schemes. Individuals could differ in their willingness to accept the iliquidity constraint required to participate in the investing scheme. They might prefer keeping savings as cash when facing high short-term income uncertainty. We develop a tractable model where subjects can save on interest-free cash accounts and/or on interest-paying iliquid pension accounts, while facing income uncertainty between the investment decision and the availability of withdraws of incentivized savings. We use numerical simulation and contextual experiments to investigate how prudence in face of uncertainty and the implicit returns of pension accounts contribute to participation (or lack thereof) on incentivized savings schemes.